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Recent Developments
Wallace v. Jaffree: MOMENT OF
SILENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The appellee, Ishmael J affree, filed a
complaint in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama on
behalf of three of his children seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. See Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala.
1982). The complaint alleged that the
local school board, through its teachers,
was engaged in the "maintenance of regular religious prayer services ... in violation of the First Amendment as made
applicable to states by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct.
2479, 2482-83 (1985) (citation omitted).
The original complaint was subsequently
amended to join the Governor of the State
of Alabama and various state officials as
party defendants in the action, obtain class
certification, and to challenge the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes.
The district court initially determined
that two of the three statutes were unconstitutional because their sole purpose was
to "encourage a religious activity." Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court
entered a preliminary injunction. Later,
however, the court conducted a trial on
the merits and determined that the statutes
did not violate the first amendment to the
constitution because "the first amendment
... does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion." Id. at 2484. The court
purported to base its conclusion on what
it viewed as "newly discovered historical
evidence" that the framers of the constitution did not intend to proscribe state establishment of religion, only national establishment of a dominant religion. The
Supreme Court per Stevens, J. found that
this "remarkable conclusion" was without
merit and affirmed the court of appeals
reversal of the district court. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985). The sole
issue on appeal was whether the statute
which authorized a moment of silence "or
voluntary prayer" was constitutional under the establishment clause of the first
amendment.

The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to go beyond the "secular purpose"
prong of the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens declared that
"the record ... reveals that the enactment
of ... [the statute] was not motivated by
any clearly secular purpose - indeed, the
statute had no secular purpose." Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. at 2490 (emphasis original). The Court referred to the trial record

Id. at 2492. The Court concluded:

The importance of [the principle of
complete neutrality toward religion]
does not permit us to treat this as an
inconsequential case involving nothing more than a few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political
majority.... Keeping in mind ...
'both the fundamental place held by
the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad,
subtle ways in which Establishment
Clause values can be erroded,' we
conclude that ... [the statute] violates
the First Amendment.
Id. at 2492-93 (citations omitted).
There were two concurring opinions in
Jaffree. Justice Powell expressed concern
that continued criticism of the Lemon test

and recalled the testimony of one of the
sponsors of the legislation. This individual
had testified that, apart from a desire to return prayer to the public schools, he "did
not have no other purpose in mind" [sic]
when he pressed for enactment of the proposed statute in the state legislature. Id.
at 2490.
The Court observed that since an earlier
statute already afforded school children
the opportunity to engage in voluntary
silent prayer, the legislative intent to return vocal prayer to the public schools
was evident. Indeed, the Court noted that
the state itself had not expressed any secular motivation for the statute in its brief to
the Court. Id. at 2491. Thus, the Court
found that the addition of the words "or
voluntary prayer" to the previous statute
indicated "that the State intended to characterize prayer as the favored practice."

would tend to "encourage other courts to
feel free to decide Establishment Clause
cases on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 2494. He
pointed out that the Lemon inquiry provided the courts with "identifie[ d] standards that have proven useful in analyzing
case after case .... " Id. at 2493-94. Finally, Justice Powell expressly indicated
that he would have little difficulty upholding any statute which authorized "a
straightforward moment-of-silence." Id.
at 2495.
In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor also expressly endorsed the "moment-of-silence" concept
and affirmed her basic confidence in the
Lemon standards. However, on this latter
point she urged changes in the manner in
which the Court applies the Lemon test.
Justice O'Connor indicated that the obvious problem in examining statutes under the establishment and free exercise
clauses is the conflict which is created
when the two clauses are "expanded to a
logical extreme." Id. at 2504. (citation
omitted). That is to say, that when government acts in a manner which is of benefit to religion (as in providing free bus
transportation to and from school for all
pupils in a county, whether they attend
public or sectarian schools), it is arguable
that government is thereby "promoting"
or "establishing" religion. If, on the other
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hand, government acts in a manner which
has an adverse effect on sectarian interests
(such as withholding free bus transportation from pupils at sectarian schools) it is
equally arguable that government is acting
to "inhibit" the free exercise of religion.
Justice O'Connor expressed the view
that the Court has, in the past, "exacerbated the conflict by calling for government 'neutrality' toward religion." She
declared: "The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable
limits to the Government's license to promote the free exercise of religion." Id.
at 2496. To this end, Justice O'Connor
would add an "endorsement test" by
which the "effect" and "purpose" prongs
of the Lemon test would be judged. This
proposal was originally advocated by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984)
(holding that expenditures by the state for
the purpose of erecting a nativity creche
did not violate the establishment clause).
The "endorsement test" advocated by Justice O'Connor would ostensibly enhance
the Lemon purpose and effect tests by focussing on "whether [the] government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether
the statute actually conveys a message of
endorsement." Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. at 2497.
12- The Law ForurnJFal~ 1985

While the "endorsement" concept articulated by Justice O'Connor may appear
intriguing, it is hardly a novel concept; it
is merely a restatement of the Lemon "effect" test which calls for a determination
of whether a statute "advances" religion.
Indeed, it seemingly would substitute
"endorsement" for "advancement" and
thereby weaken the Lemon inquiry. Justice O'Connor went on to illustrate the
application of the "endorsement" test in
circumstances analogous to those before
the Court in the instant case.
Presumably, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test would allow states to enact
"moment of silence" statutes which expressly informed the student that he or
she is free to use that moment to silently
pray. However, as was clearly expressed
by the majority opinion, the addition of
the words "or to pray" permit the student
nothing beyond that which he or she already had, and can be interpreted in no
other way but as an "endorsement" of religion. Conversely, failure to include such
words in a statute do nothing to inhibit a
student's freedom of silent expression or
exercise of religion. Accordingly, the conflicting values inherent in the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, "if expanded to their logical
extremes", need never "clash". While Jus-

tice O'Connor correctly pointed out that
"the courts are capable of distinguishing a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one",
Id. at 2500, implementation of a so-called
"endorsement" test would do little to clarify
the inquiry.
Maryland's "moment-of-silence" statute,
Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-104 (1985),
would seem to run afoul of the constitutional standards set out in Lemon and its
progeny. The statute provides:
(a) Silent meditation. Principal and
teachers in each public elementary
and secondary school in this State
may require all students to be
present and participate in opening
exercises on each morning of a
school day and to meditate silently
for approximately 1 minute.
(b) Praying or reading holy scripture
permitted. During this period, a

student or teacher may read the
holy scripture or pray.
The provision which appears to vest in
each individual principal and teacher discretionary power to compel attendance at
moment of silence exercises in the public
schools appears to go well beyond even
the statute struck down in Jaffree. By its
very terms, the statute is neither voluntary nor does it enhance privacy of thought
or deed. Further, the provisions which
allow such compelled attendance at an exercise in which the participants (including
teachers) are encouraged to produce "holy
scripture(s)" are clearly violative of the
Lemon test. Finally, the statute contains
the "or [to] pray" language held offensive
in Jaffree.
It seems clear that the Maryland statute
would not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Accordingly, the statute should be redrafted to reflect the "moment-of-silence"
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
Jaffree.
- Christopher N. Luhn

